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Abstract. Security plays an important role in the development of multiagent 
systems. However, a careful analysis of software development processes shows 
that the definition of security requirements is, usually, considered after the de-
sign of the system. This is, mainly, due to the fact that agent oriented software 
engineering methodologies have not integrated security concerns throughout 
their developing stages. The integration of security concerns during the whole 
range of the development stages could help towards the development of more 
secure multiagent systems. In this paper2 we introduce a constraint-based ap-
proach that extends the Tropos methodology in order to model security con-
cerns throughout the whole development process. A description of the new 
concepts is given along with a security oriented process that integrates these 
concepts in Tropos. 
1   Introduction 
Security plays an important role in the development of multiagent systems and is 
considered as one of the main issues to be dealt for agent technology to be widely 
used outside the research community. As a result, research on security for Multiagent 
systems is an important area within the agent research community. However, the re-
search has been mainly focused on the solution of individual security problems of the 
multiagent systems, such as attacks from an agent to another agent, attacks from a 
platform to an agent, and attacks from an agent to a platform. 
Only very little work has taken place in considering security requirements as an in-
tegral part of the whole software development process. None of the existing agent 
oriented methodologies, to our knowledge, have been demonstrated enough evidence 
to support claims of adequately integrate security modeling during the whole software 
development stages. Only recently, some initial steps have been taken towards this 
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direction. Liu and Yu have initiated work [12] that provides ways of modeling and 
reasoning about non-functional requirements (with emphasis on security). Yu is using 
the concept of a soft goal to assess different design alternatives, and how each of these 
alternatives would contribute positively or negatively in achieving the soft goal.  
Lodderstedt et al present a modeling language, based on UML, called SecureUML 
[13]. Their approach is focused on modeling access control policies and how these 
(policies) can be integrated into a model-driven software development process. Dif-
ferently than these two approaches that are focused in particular stages of the devel-
opment (Yu’s effort is focused only in the requirements area while Lodderstedt’s work 
is focused in the design stage) our approach covers the whole development process. It 
is important to consider security using the same concepts and notations during the 
whole development process.  
In addition, Huget [14] proposes a new methodology, called Nemo and claims that 
it tackles security. In his approach, security is not considered as a specific model but it 
is included within the other models of the methodology. Nemo is a new methodology 
and as such it has not been extensively presented on literature. From our point of view, 
the methodology tackles security quite superficial and as the developer states “par-
ticularly, security has to be intertwined more deeply within models” [14]. Thus, more 
evidence will be required to satisfy the claim of the developer that the methodology 
tackles security.  
Because of the lack of a structured approach to consider security issues in the de-
velopment of computer systems, the common approach towards the inclusion of secu-
rity within a system is to identify security requirements after the definition of a system. 
This approach has provoked the emergence of computer systems afflicted with secu-
rity vulnerabilities [4]. From the viewpoint of the traditional security paradigm, it 
should be possible to eliminate such problems through better integration of security 
and systems engineering.  
We believe that security concerns should be considered during the whole develop-
ment process of a multiagent system and it should be defined together with the re-
quirements specification. Taking security requirements into account together with the 
functional requirements of a Multiagent system throughout the development stages 
helps to limit cases of conflict between security and system requirements, by identify-
ing them very early in the system development, and find ways to overcome them. On 
the other hand, adding security as an afterthought not only increases the chances of 
such a conflict to exist, but it requires huge amount of money and valuable time to 
overcome it, once they have been identified (usually a major rebuild of the system is 
needed).  
In this paper, we introduce extensions to the Tropos methodology to accommodate 
security concerns during the software development stages.  Section 2 provides an 
overview of the Tropos methodology, and Section 3 introduces the secure concepts of 
the secure Tropos. In Section 4 we discuss the security oriented process of the secure 
Tropos, whereas section 5 concludes the paper.  
2 Tropos and Secure Tropos 
Tropos [5] is a software development methodology, for building agent-oriented 
software systems, that uses concepts such as actors, goals, soft goals, tasks, resources 
and intentional dependencies throughout all the phases of the software development 
[6]. A key feature of Tropos is that it pays great deal of attention to the early require-
ments analysis that precedes the specification of the perspective requirements, empha-
sizing the need to understand the how and why the intended system would meet the 
organisational goals.  
Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework [15], which uses the concepts of actors, 
goals and social dependencies for defining the obligations of actors (dependees) to 
other actors (dependers). This means the multiagent system and its environment are 
viewed as a set of actors, who depend on other actors to help them fulfil their goals. 
An actor [15] represents an entity that has intentionality and strategic goals within 
the multiagent system or within its organisational setting. An actor can be a (social) 
agent, a position, or a role. Agents can be physical agents, such as a person, or soft-
ware agents. A role represents an abstract characterisation of the behaviour of a social 
actor within some specialised context or domain of endeavour [15]. A position repre-
sents a set of roles, typically played by one agent.       
A (hard) goal [15] represents a condition in the world that an actor would like to 
achieve. In other words, goals represent actor’s strategic interests. In Tropos, the con-
cept of a hard-goal (simply goal hereafter) is differentiated from the concept of soft-
goal.  A soft-goal is used to capture non-functional requirements of the system, and 
unlike a (hard) goal, it does not have clear criteria for deciding whether it is satisfied 
or not and therefore it is subject to interpretation [15]. For instance, an example of a 
soft-goal is “the system should be scalable”.  
A task (also called plan) represents, at an abstract level, a way of doing something 
[Giu02]. The fulfilment of a task can be a means for satisfying a goal, or for contribut-
ing towards the satisficing of a soft-goal. In Tropos different (alternative) tasks, that 
actors might employ to achieve their goals, are modelled. Therefore developers can 
reason about the different ways that actors can achieve their goals and decide for the 
best possible way.  
A resource [6, 10] presents a physical or informational entity that one of the actors 
requires. The main concern when dealing with resources is whether the resource is 
available and who is responsible for its delivery.  
A dependency [15] between two actors represents that one actor depends on the 
other to attain some goal, execute a task, or deliver a resource. The depending actor is 
called the depender and the actor who is depended upon is called the dependee. 
The type of the dependency describes the nature of an agreement (called dependum) 
between dependee and depender. Goal dependencies represent delegation of responsi-
bility for fulfilling a goal. Soft-goal dependencies are similar to goal dependencies, 
but their fulfillment cannot be defined precisely whereas task dependencies are used in 
situations where the dependee is required to perform a given activity. Resource de-
pendencies require the dependee to provide a resource to the depender. By depending 
on the dependee for the dependum, the depender is able to achieve goals that it is 
otherwise unable to achieve on their own, or not as easily or not as well [15]. On the 
other hand, the depender becomes vulnerable, since if the dependee fails to deliver the 
dependum, the depender is affected in their aim to achieve their goals. 
A capability [6, 10] represents the ability of an actor of defining, choosing and exe-
cuting a task for the fulfillment of a goal, given certain world conditions and in pres-
ence of a specific event.   
Figure 1 Error! Reference source not found.depicts a graphical representation of 
the above-mentioned concepts as used in the Tropos methodology.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The concepts in Tropos 
Tropos supports four development stages, namely early and late requirements, ar-
chitectural design, and detailed design. Early and late requirements analysis repre-
sents the initial phases in the Tropos methodology and the final goal is to provide a set 
of functional and non-functional requirements for the system-to-be. Both phases, early 
and late, share the same conceptual and methodological approach. This means, that 
most of the techniques used during the early requirements analysis are used for the late 
as well. The main difference is that during the early requirements analysis, the devel-
oper models the main stakeholders of the system and their dependencies, while in the 
late requirements analysis the developer models the system itself by introducing it as 
another actor and model its dependencies with the other actors of the organisation. 
The architectural design stage defines the system’s global architecture in terms of 
actors interconnected through data and control flows (represented as dependencies). In 
addition, during this stage the actors of the system are mapped into a set of software 
agents, each characterized by its specific capabilities. During the detailed design 
stage, the developer specifies, in detail, the agents’ goals, beliefs, and capabilities as 
well as the communication between the agents. For this reason, Tropos employs a set 
of AUML diagrams [7].  
Tropos was not conceived with security in mind and as a result it fails to adequately 
capture security requirements [8, 9]. The process of integrating security and functional 
requirements throughout the whole range of the development stages is quite ad hoc, 
and in addition, the concept of soft goal that Tropos uses to capture security require-
ments fails to adequately capture some constraints that security requirements often 
represent [8, 9]. 
Therefore, we have extended the Tropos methodology to enable developers to ade-
quately capture security requirements. The next section describes our extensions.  
3 Secure Concepts in Secure Tropos 
Extra concepts were introduced to the methodology to enable it to model security 
requirements during the software development process. These are: 
 
Security Diagram [9], which represents the connection between security features, 
threats, protection objectives, and security mechanisms that help towards the satisfac-
tion of the objectives. Security features [9] represent security related features that the 
system-to-be must have. Protection objectives [9] represent a set of principles that 
contribute towards the achievement of the security features. Threats [9] on the other 
hand represent circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or problems that can 
put in danger the security features of the system, while security mechanisms [9] iden-
tify possible protection mechanisms of achieving protection objectives.  The main 
purpose of the security reference diagram is to allow flexibility during the develop-
ment stages of a multiagent system and also to save time and effort. Many systems 
under development are similar to systems already in existence. Therefore the security 
reference diagram can be used as a reference point that can be modified or extended 
according to specific needs of particular systems.  
The analysis done during the construction of the security reference diagram can be 
used later in the development process to identify security constraints that must be 
introduced to the system-to-be (by taking into account the security needs of the sys-
tem) and also by identifying possible means (security mechanisms) that contribute 
towards the satisfaction of the security constraints that are introduced to the system. 
The notation of the security reference diagram can be adapted to reflect the nota-
tion of the methodology that the diagram is integrated. This is very useful since it 
allows developers to work with well-known concepts and allows them to use the same 
concepts throughout the development process. In this work, concepts from the Tropos 
methodology such as soft-goals, goals and tasks are used to model security features, 
protection objectives and security mechanisms respectively 
Security Constraint [9], which represents, generally speaking, constraints that are 
related to the security of the system. A security constraint is defined as a restriction 
related to security issues, such as privacy, integrity and availability, which can influ-
ence the analysis and design of a multiagent system under development by restricting 
some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements of the 
system, or by refining some of the system’s objectives [9].  
Since, security constraints can influence the security of the system either positively 
or negatively, we further define positive and negative security constraints respec-
tively. An example of a positive security constraint could be Allow Access Only to 
Personal Information, while a negative security constraint could be Send Information 
Plain Text (not encrypted).  A graphical representation of a security constraint can be 
found in figure 3. 
Secure Entities [9], which represent any secure goals/tasks/ resources of the sys-
tem. A secure goal represents the strategic interests of an actor with respect to secu-
rity. Secure goals are mainly introduced in order to achieve possible security con-
straints that are imposed to an actor or exist in the system. However, a secure goal 
does not particularly define how the security constraints can be achieved, since alter-
natives can be considered. The precise definition of how the secure goal can be 
achieved is given by a secure task.  A secure task is defined as a task that represents 
a particular way for satisfying a secure goal. A secure resource can be defined as 
an informational entity that is related to the security of the multiagent system. Secure 
resources can be divided into two main categories. Those that display some security 
characteristics, imposed by other entities, such as security constraints, secure goals, 
secure tasks and secure dependencies.  
In addition, the graphical representation of the Tropos entities has been extended to 
enable it to model the secure entities. Secure entities are indicated by the presence of 
an S within brackets before the description of the entity as shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Secure Entities 
Secure Dependencies [9], represent that a dependency between two actors in-
volves the introduction of a security constraint that must be satisfied either by the 
depender, the dependee or both for the dependency to be valid. Secure dependencies 
are categorized into depender secure dependency, in which the depender introduces 
security constraints for the dependency and the dependee must satisfy the security 
constraints for the dependency to be valid, dependee Secure Dependency, in which the 
dependee introduces security constraints and the depender must satisfy them, and 
double Secure Dependency, in which both the depender and the dependee introduce 
security constraints for the dependency that both must satisfy for the dependency to be 
valid. A graphical representation of the different types of secure dependencies is 
shown in figure 3. 
Secure Capabilities, which represent capabilities that the actors (agents) of the 
system must have in order to help towards the satisfaction of the security requirements 
of the system. 
 Fig. 3. Secure Dependencies 
4 Modeling Security with Secure Tropos 
The security-oriented process of secure Tropos is mainly divided into four sub-
activities; (1) The identification of security requirements of a multiagent system; (2) 
the selection amongst alternative architectural styles for the system-to-be according to 
the identified security requirements; (3) the development of a design that satisfies the 
security requirements of the system; (4) and the attack testing of the multiagent system 
under development. 
To make the process easier to understand, we use a case study from the health and 
social care sector, the electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system [9], an 
agent based health and social are information system. 
The process of identifying the security requirements of the system is basically one 
of analysing the security needs of the stakeholders and the system in terms of security 
constraints imposed to the system and the stakeholders, and identify secure goals and 
entities that guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints.  
The first step in the security process consists of the construction of the security ref-
erence diagram [9]. For instance, the security reference diagram of the eSAP system is 
shown in figure 4.  
As shown in the figure, the main security features for the electronic single assess-
ment process system are privacy, integrity and availability.  Health and social care 
professionals are worried that using such a system introduces risks for the privacy of 
personal health and social care information. Therefore privacy of health and social 
care information, such as the health and social care plans used in the electronic single 
assessment process, is the number one security concern in such a system. According to 
the Good Medical Practice, patients have a right to expect that you will not pass on 
any personal information, which you learn in the course of your professional duties 
unless they agree. 
  
 
Fig. 4. eSAP security reference diagram 
Other important concerns are integrity and availability. Integrity assures that infor-
mation is not corrupted and availability ensures the information is always available to 
authorised health and social care professionals. If assessment information is corrupted 
or it is not available the care provided to the patients by the health and social care 
professionals will not be efficient or accurate. Therefore, it is necessary to find ways 
to help towards the privacy, the integrity and the availability of personal health and 
social care information.  
When the security reference diagram is complete, the analysis of the actors of the 
multiagent system takes place and security constraints are imposed to the actors of the 
system. In addition, security constraints are imposed to the system-to-be, with the aid 
of the security reference diagram as shown in figure 5. 
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 Fig. 5. Analysis of the eSAP actor 
When the security requirements of the system-to-be and the involved actors have 
been identified, the next step in the process consists of identifying an architectural 
style for the system that will satisfy the security requirements.   
For this reason, we have developed an analysis technique to enable developers to 
select among alternative architectural styles using as criteria the non-functional re-
quirements of the multiagent system under development. The technique is based on an 
independent probabilistic model, which uses the measure of satisfiability proposed by 
Giorgini et al. [16]. Satisfiability represents the probability that a non-functional re-
quirement will be satisfied. Therefore, the analysis involves the identification of spe-
cific non-functional requirements and the evaluation of different architectural styles 
against these requirements.  
The evaluation results in contribution relationships from the different architectural 
styles to the probability of satisfying the non-functional requirements of the system. 
To express the contribution of each style to the satisfiability of each non-functional 
requirement of the system, a weight is assigned.  Weights take a value between 0 and 
1. For example, 0.1 means the probability that the architectural style will satisfy the 
non-functional requirement is very low (the style is not suitable for satisfying the re-
quirement). On the other hand, a weight of 0.9 means the probability that the architec-
tural style will satisfy the non-functional requirement is very high (the style is suitable 
for satisfying the requirement).  
The weights of the contribution links are assigned after reviewing different studies, 
evaluations, and comparisons involving the architectural styles under evaluation. 
When the contribution weights for each architectural style to the different non-
functional requirements of the system have been assigned, the best-suited architectural 
style is decided. This decision involves the categorization of the non-functional re-
quirements according to the importance to the system and the identification of the 
architectural style that best satisfies the most important non-functional requirement 
using a propagation algorithm, such as the one presented by Giorgini et al. [16]. 
In this example, we consider two architectural styles, a hierarchical style –
client/server - and a mobile code style -mobile agents. As shown in figure 6, each of 
the two styles satisfies differently each of the non-functional requirements of the sys-
tem. For instance, the mobile agents style allows more scalable applications (weight 
0.8), because of the dynamic deployment of the mobile code. 
 
 
Fig. 6. client-Server versus Mobile Agents 
As concluded from the analysis presented in figure 6 (and elaborated more in [9]), 
the client/server style satisfies more the privacy requirements of the system than the 
mobile agents style.  This is mainly because mobility is involved in the mobile agents 
style. Therefore, although protection of a server from mobile agents, or generally 
mobile code, is an evolution of security mechanisms applied in other architectural 
styles, such as client/server; the mechanisms focused on the protection of the mobile 
agents from the server cannot, so far, prevent malicious behaviour from occurring but 
may be able to detect it. Consider for example, the Check Information Flow secure 
task of the eSAP.  The information flow property is more easily damaged by employ-
ing mobile agents (weight 0.4) since possible platforms that a mobile agent could visit 
might expose sensitive information from the agent. In the case of the client/server 
style (weight 0.8) sensitive information is stored in the server and existing well-proven 
security measures could be taken to satisfy the information flow attribute.  
The third activity of the security process involves the development of a design that 
satisfies the security requirements of the system. For this, a pattern language consist-
ing of security patterns for multiagent systems is proposed and this language is inte-
grated within the development process of the Tropos methodology. Security patterns 
document proven solutions to security related problems in such a way that are appli-
cable by non-security specialists. Therefore, the application of security patterns in the 
development of multiagent systems can provide effective answers to the above-
mentioned questions, since non-security specialists can rely on expert knowledge and 
apply well-proven solutions to solve security problems in a structured and systematic 
way. The use of security patterns enables non-security specialists to identify patterns 
for transforming the security requirements of their system into design, and also be 
aware of the consequences that each of the applied security patterns introduce to their 
system. Additionally, because security patterns capture well-proven solutions, it is 
more likely that the application of security patterns will satisfy the security require-
ments of the system. 
Therefore, we have developed a security pattern language [9] and we have inte-
grated it within our security-oriented process. Figure 7 describes the relationship of 
the patterns of the language as well as their relationship with existing patterns. Each 
box indicates a pattern, where a solid-line box indicates a security pattern that belongs 
to the language developed by this research and a dashed-line box indicates a related 
existing pattern. White triangles depict generalisations/ specialisation and solid lines 
associations of type uses/ requires.  
 
Fig. 7. The security  pattern language 
The AGENCY GUARD is the starting point of applying the patterns of the lan-
guage and it is a variant of the Embassy and the Proxy patterns. It uses the AGENT 
AUTHENTICATOR pattern to ensure the identity of the agents, the SANDBOX 
pattern in order to restrict the actions of agents, and the ACCESS CONTROLER 
pattern to restrict access to the system resources.  
On the other hand, the SANDBOX pattern can implement the Checkpoint pattern, 
and the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR pattern can use the Session pattern to store 
credentials of the agent. Moreover, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR employs the 
Cryptographic Key Generation and the Cryptographic Key Exchange patterns for 
further cryptographic actions. 
To understand how the patterns of the language can be applied during the devel-
opment of a system, from the internal analysis of the eSAP system we have concluded 
that Information Flow, Authentication and Access Control checks must be per-
formed in order for the eSAP system to satisfy the secure goal Ensure System Pri-
vacy. In the case of the Information Flow secure task, the eSAP should be able to 
control how information flows within the system, and between the system and other 
actors. For example, the system should be able to control who requires access to the 
system and, by considering the security policy, to grant or deny access to the system. 
With respect to the Authentication checks, the system should be able to authenticate 
any agents that send a request to access information of the system, and in the case of 
the Access Control, the system should be able to control access to its resources. To 
meet these goals, The AGENCY GUARD pattern can be used to grant/deny access to 
the system according to the security policy, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR pattern 
can be used to provide authentication checks and the ACCESS CONTROLER pat-
tern to perform access control checks as shown in figure 8.  The use of these patterns 
not only satisfies the fulfillment of the secure goals of the system but also guarantees 
the validity of the solution. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Using the pattern language 
The last activity of the security process in secure Tropos involves the testing of the 
developed solution against potential security attacks. For this reason, we have devel-
oped a process that is based on security attack scenarios.  
A Security Attack Scenario (SAS) is defined as an attack situation describing the 
agents of a multiagent system and their secure capabilities as well as possible attack-
ers and their goals, and it identifies how the secure capabilities of the system prevent 
(if they prevent) the satisfaction of the attackers’ goals [9].  
A security attack scenario involves possible attacks to a multiagent system, a possible 
attacker, the resources that are attacked, and the agents of the system related to the 
attack. An attacker is depicted as an agent who aims to break the security of the sys-
tem. The attacker intentions are modelled as goals and tasks and their analysis follows 
the same reasoning techniques that the Tropos methodology employs for goal and task 
analysis. Attacks are depicted as dash-lined links, called attack links, which contain an 
“attacks” tag, starting from one of the attacker’s goals and ending at the attacked re-
source.  
The process is divided into three main stages [9]: creation of the scenario, valida-
tion of the scenario, and testing and redefinition of the system according to the 
scenario. During the creation of a scenario, Tropos goal diagram notation is used for 
analysing the intentions of an attacker in terms of goals and tasks, identify a set of 
attacks according to the attacker’s goals, and also identify the agents of the system that 
posses capabilities to prevent the identified attacks.  
When the scenarios have been created, they must be validated. Therefore, during 
the scenario validation process software inspections are used. The inspection of the 
scenarios involves the identification of any possible violations of the Tropos syntax 
and of any possible inconsistencies between the scenarios and the models of the previ-
ous stages. Such an inspection involves the use of validation checklists. Such a check 
list has been proposed for instance in [9]. 
When the scenarios have been validated, the next step aims to identify test cases 
and test, using those test cases, the security of the system against any potential attacks. 
Each test case is derived from a possible attack depicted in the security attack scenar-
ios. The test cases are applied and a decision is formed to whether the system can 
prevent the identified attacks or not. The decision whether an attack can be prevented 
(and in what degree) or not lies on the developer. However as an indication of the 
decision it must be taken into consideration that at least one secure capability must 
help an attack, in order for the developer to decide the attack can be prevented. At-
tacks that cannot be prevented are notated as solid attack links, as opposed to attacks 
that the system can prevent and which are notated as dashed attack links.  
For each attack that it has been decided it cannot be prevented, extra capabilities 
must be assigned to the system to help towards the prevention of that attack. In gen-
eral, the assignment of extra secure capabilities is not a unique process and depends 
on the perception of the developer regarding the attack dangers. However, a good 
approach could be to analyse the capabilities of the attacker used to perform the attack 
and assign the system with capabilities that can revoke the attacker’s capabilities. 
For instance, let us consider an interception attack scenario in which a possible at-
tacker wishes to attack the privacy of the system, in other words to obtain information 
such as assessment information or a care plan. As identified in the analysis of the 
security reference diagram, social engineering, password sniffing and eavesdrop-
ping are the main threats to the privacy of the system. Therefore, the attacker’s main 
goal can be decomposed to Read Data and Get Access to the System sub-goals as 
shown figure 9. The first sub-goal involves the attacker trying to read the data that it is 
transmitted to and from the eSAP system, whereas the second sub-goal involves the 
attacker trying to break into the system and gain access to it. 
 
 
 Fig. 9. An example of a security attack scenario 
To accomplish the first sub-goal the Attacker should try to read the data transferred 
between the Social Worker and the eSAP system’s actors such as the Assessment 
Evaluator and the Authenticator. To accomplish the second sub-goal, the Attacker 
might use password sniffing or social engineering. In the first case, the Attacker 
scans all the resources that flow in the network looking for passwords whereas in the 
case of social engineering, the Attacker tries to deceive the Social Worker in order 
to obtain valuable information, such as their authorisation details that will allow 
them to gain access to the system. 
Therefore, for the presented attack scenario, the reaction of the system should be 
tested against three test cases, read data, password sniffing and social 
engineering. Due to lack of space we only present the read data test case as shown 
below. 
 
Test Case 1: read data 
Precondition: The Social Worker actor tries to obtain an assessment evaluation. The 
Attacker tries to read the transmitted data.  
System expected security reaction: The system should prevent Attacker from 
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reading any important information. 
Discussion: The Attacker will try to read the data from any resource transmitted 
between the external agents and the eSAP system. However, curerntly the system and 
its external agents have capabilities to encrypt and decrypt data. As a result all the 
important data is transmitted across the network encrypted and therefore it is difficult 
for the Attacker to read it. However, the Attacker might try to obtain (or sometimes 
even guess) the encryption key.    
Test Case Result: The system is protected against read data attacks. However, a 
recommendation would be for the system to have capabilities to change the 
cryptographic algorithm often. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper presents results from our work to extend Tropos methodology to enable 
it to consider security requirements throughout its development stages. During the 
process of extending Tropos some very useful observations were obtained. First of all, 
the concept of constraints is a natural extension of the Tropos methodology and it 
allows for a systematic approach towards the modelling of security requirements. This 
is because, although functional and security requirements are defined alongside, a 
clear distinction is provided. Secondly, the security diagram allows identifying desired 
security requirements very early in the development stages, and helps to propagate 
them until the implementation stage, introducing a security-oriented paradigm to the 
software process. In addition, the iterative nature of the methodology, allows the re-
definition of security requirements in different levels therefore providing a better 
integration with system functionality. 
However, this in an ongoing research and more work is required to achieve our 
aim, which is to provide a well guided process of integrating security and functional 
requirements throughout the software development process of agent-based systems, 
using the same concepts and notations throughout the process. Currently we are work-
ing on refining the identified concepts, notations, and the process, and we are integrat-
ing our extensions to the Formal Tropos [6] specification language. This will enable 
us to formally evaluate our extensions, since Formal Tropos is amenable to formal 
analysis. 
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